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Practices of Hopi Religious Freedom in 
Hopitutskwa 
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ABSTRACT 
     This paper considers how U.S. federal laws, 
policies, and practices concerning the exercise of 
religious freedom are met by the efforts of Hopi people 
to practice their religious obligations on their 
aboriginal lands. Despite the longstanding recognition 
that Hopi religion demands an ethic, practice, and 
commitment toward stewardship of lands both on and 
off the contemporary Hopi Reservation, repeated 
attempts by Hopi to practice their religion on U.S. 
National Forest lands have been thwarted by U.S. 
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officials. To explore why this is so, and how it is 
possible that the very laws and policies designed to 
protect Hopi religion may in fact hinder it, I take up two 
recent examples of conflict among Hopi and federal 
officials over the use of public lands. One involves the 
litigation initiated in the last decades of the twentieth 
century by Hopi and other tribal nations in the region 
to stop the U.S. Forest service from approving artificial 
snowmaking at a ski resort in the Coconino National 
Forest, outside Flagstaff, Arizona.  
     Another considers the circumstances surrounding 
the 2013 sale of lands in the Tonto National Forest near 
Payson, Arizona, and the efforts by the Hopi tribe to 
consult with U.S. Forest Service officials about the 
significance of archaeological sites discovered within 
the sale lands. In both examples I explore how, even 
after passage of various statutes and protocols 
designed to protect religious expression generally as 
well as those protecting the rights of Native Americans 
to the cultural property that their religions often 
require, Hopi continue to find themselves stymied in 
their efforts to observe the full breadth of their religious 
beliefs, beliefs in which nature, culture, and the paths 
of human life in which they are joined are seemingly 
always thrown off course. Beyond  a consultative role, 
this paper argues that federal agencies should consider 
processes that give tribal nations active co-
management authority, at least on a case-by-case basis,  
consistent with principles outlined in the Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, and 
regulations promulgated pursuant to it, but which 
currently apply only to Department of Interior 
agencies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trudging up a small rise on the dusty, unmarked chaparral trail 
we had just taken across the Payson Ranger District of the Tonto 
National Forest in Arizona, my Hopi colleagues, who had been joking 
with each other just moments before, had now grown silent. Though it 
was early morning, it was already hot in central Arizona, even in the 
higher elevations of what locals call the “Rim Country” at the Southern 
edge of the Colorado Plateau.  
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
2016] PATHS IN THE WILDERNESS 219 
I remember thinking that it must be the heat and the exertion from 
the hike that was quieting everyone down. And while that might have 
been the case, it was also true that when we made it to our 
destination—a ridge with a commanding view of the spruce pine fields 
in valley below, interspersed with roughhewn sandstone blocks and 
red, rocky outcrops reminiscent of the more spectacular mesas of 
nearby Sedona, Arizona—that the silence may have also been a kind 
of reverence. For it was followed by my colleagues’ whispers of 
kwaakwhá (“thanks”), punctuated with an occasional Is uti! (“Oh 
my!”).  
As it turned out, we had arrived at and were standing amidst what 
archaeologists have identified as a site of human occupation, and one 
that they dated to the late Pre-Classic (A.D. 750–950) and Classic 
Periods (A.D. 1200–1450) of the archaeological record of the area, a 
period of human occupation dating from between AD 1600–1875, 
accompanied as it was by artifact scatters that bore the typical 
characteristics of what they called Tonto Plain Ware and Tonto Red 
Ware ceramics.1  
But my Hopi colleagues had a different name for our destination 
on that day. They call it itaakuku (“our footprints”). Because for them, 
this place, and the other archaeological sites that can be found all over 
central and northern Arizona, mark not just the passage through the 
area of those ancestors they call Hoopoq’yaqam (“Those who went to 
the Northeast”), but also, more generally, the ongoing paths of 
commitment that Hopi make to the deity who first occupied this world, 
the Fourth World.2 That deity is Maasaw, and it is he who first 
promised them this land and the greater Hopi homeland of which it is 
a part, but only so long as they continued to move across it, learning 
from and caring for the many beings who crowd what Euro-Americans 
continue to see as otherwise empty, desert wilderness.3  
These sites then are not just places, but spaces, marks on a path 
of ethical living that the Hopi today are working hard to continue to 
follow. It is this idea of a path, what the Hopi call Hopivewat, that 
makes up the complex and ever unfolding cycle of prayer and practice 
that constitutes what non-Hopi call the Hopi religion, but which Hopi 
 
 1.  See generally JEFFERY J. CLARK, TRACKING PREHISTORIC MIGRATIONS: PUEBLO 
SETTLERS AMONG THE TONTO BASIN HOHOKOM viii, 33, 66–71 (2001); J. Scott Wood, 
Checklist of Pottery Types for the Tonto National Forest, 21 ARIZ. ARCHEOLOGICAL SOC’Y 7–
9 (1987).  
 2.  See HAROLD COURLANDER, THE FOURTH WORLD OF THE HOPIS 22 (1987). 
 3.  Kurt E. Dongoske et al., Archeological Cultures and Cultural Affiliation: Hopi and 
Zuni Perspectives in the American Southwest, 62 AM. ANTIQUITY 600, 603 (Oct. 1997). 
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simply refer to as  their path, their qatsi (“life”).4 Indeed, this path 
tracks a trail across the expanse of the Southeast corner of the Colorado 
Plateau that is their aboriginal homeland and the center of the Hopi 
universe. This life mandates that the Hopi undertake, every year, 
certain ceremonial obligations to acknowledge and care for those 
beings encountered by those who had taken these paths before them, 
those whose footprints dot the land, and whose spirits also return to 
these places.5 Indeed, as we walked along the trails encountering these 
various sites, my Hopi colleagues kept pointing to all the people 
(Hisatsinom, or “ancestors”) that had come to greet us as we 
approached their homes:, the gray hawk who eyed us from above, the 
hummingbird who hovered and zipped across our path, and the fawn 
who bolted from the underbrush when one of us strayed too close.   
While I should have probably anticipated that Hopi 
ceremonialism would break out on that hike, the nominal reason we 
were trudging in the backcountry of central Arizona was for something 
somewhat different. My colleagues had been invited down to the area, 
about 130 miles south from their villages on the Hopi Reservation, as 
part of an effort by the U.S. Forest to undertake what is known as a 
“Traditional Cultural Properties” investigation”6 on the lands of the 
Tonto National Forest. As members of the Hopi Cultural Preservation 
Office’s (HCPO) cultural resource advisory team, they served as the 
Hopi Tribal Nation’s cultural resource management arm. As such they 
were authorized by the Hopi tribal government to meet with 
representatives of non-Hopi private and public institutions and 
organizations to consult and/or negotiate the terms of use, 
maintenance, or repatriation of Hopi material and immaterial cultural 
property.7 
This was not the first time the HCPO and its cultural resources 
advisory team had conducted such consultations. Indeed, they had 
been regularly doing so since the mid-1990s, shortly after the passage 
 
 4.  PETER WHITELEY, DELIBERATE ACTS: CHANGING HOPI CULTURE THROUGH THE 
ORAIBI SPLIT 22 (1988). 
 5.  See T.J. FERGUSON & CHIP COLWELL-CHANTHAPHONH, HISTORY IS IN THE LAND: 
MULTIVOCAL TRIBAL TRADITIONS IN ARIZONA’S SAN PEDRO VALLEY 95 (2015). 
 6.  U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR NAT’L PARKS SERV., GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND 
DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1, NAT’L REG. BULL (1998) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES].  
 7.  See Hopi Tribal Council Res. H-70-94 (1994) (on file with author) (“[N]ow therefore 
be it resolved that the Hopi Tribal Council . . . . That it authorizes the Hopi Cultural 
Preservation Office to exercise administrative responsibilities to negotiate and enter into 
agreements as necessary to address the repatriation of sacred objects [and] objects of cultural 
patrimony . . . .). 
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of the Native American Graves Repatriation Act of 1990,8 legislation 
that ushered in a sea-change in the way in which Native American 
cultural property was managed by non-native institutions and agencies 
receiving federal funds.9  
It is worth emphasizing, I think, that it was members of Hopi’s 
cultural resource advisory team, of the Hopi Cultural Preservation 
Office, that were hiking those trails in Tonto, and meeting with U.S. 
Forest service representatives regarding aspects of Hopi life that are 
tied to public lands. While the HCPO is a branch of the Hopi Tribe’s 
Department of Natural Resources, none of its other branches—not the 
Wildlife and Ecosystems management office, nor its Water Resources 
program, nor its Environmental Protection Office10—were present with 
us on that hike, though they certainly could have been. Because while 
it may be the case that for non-Hopi, the land, flora, and fauna we 
encountered in Tonto on that hot day were likely seen as wilderness of 
one kind or another, for the Hopi such meetings are something 
altogether more. The lands we were crossing in the Tonto are within 
the southern parts of Hopitutskwa, the aboriginal expanse of Hopi 
homeland that stretches from the confluence of the Verde and Salt 
Rivers in the South, meeting and following the Puerco River to the 
East, including the Grand Canyon and Lake Powell in the West and 
North, but arguably beyond.11 For the Hopi, the lands that make up 
Hopitutskwa are anything but the open, wild, perhaps even empty, 
space that seem to be conjured by the concept of wilderness, public 
lands, or even National Forest. From a Hopi perspective these are 
crowded, busy, buzzing places. To that extent, we might follow French 
anthropologist Philippe Descola, Eduardo Kohn, and others who 
wonder whether the too-easy division between Nature and Culture 
even makes sense when describing how Hopi engage with places like 
 
 8.  Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified as enacted at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13, 1170 (1990)) (requiring 
Federal agencies and institutions receiving federal funding and in possession of Native 
American cultural items to inventory said items, and within 6 months of completion notify 
those Native American tribes or lineal descendants who can claim cultural affiliation, and if 
requested, to expeditiously return such cultural items). 
 9.  As one USFS Archaeologist with over 30 years of experience explained, prior to the 
passage of NAGRPA, “Nobody in the federal government really consulted tribes . . . back 
then . . . . Once NAGPRA came in, the world changed, and we started doing things a lot 
differently.” Interview with USFS Archaeologist (July 10, 2013). 
 10.  Tribal Services, HOPI TRIBE, http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/tribal-services (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2016). 
 11.  For a historical background on the delineation of Hopitutskwa, see LEIGH JENKINS ET 
AL., A REEXAMAINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF HOPITUTSQWA (Nov. 11, 1994). 
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the Tonto.12 
Indeed, when we understand that the very word Hopi signifies not 
only the ethno-national identity of the people who constitute members 
of the contemporary Hopi Tribal Nation, but even more fundamentally, 
is an expression of ethnical valuation, a marker of right behavior, used 
to describe those who “behave well.” We gain an insight into what they 
mean when they describe their land Hopitutskwa, and perhaps even the 
earth itself, as a space and place to which they owe ethical obligations, 
as they promised to Maasaw, the one who allowed them to reside 
there.13 These obligations, the Hopi will tell you, can only be fulfilled 
through adherence to certain religious and ritual practices that must be 
performed.  As was artfully stated in a 1951 petition by the leaders of 
a Hopi village to the U.S. Indian Claims Commission, “The Hopi 
Tusqua [sic]… is our love and will always be, and it is the land upon 
which our leader fixes and tells the dates for our religious life. Our 
land, our religion, and our life are one…”14  
It is no surprise then that the Hopi have long-standing claims to 
lands well beyond the 1.5 million acres that make up their current 
reservation, currently held by the U.S. government in the form of 
National Forest lands, and that many of those claims turn on the 
religious duties and obligations they are required to undertake in a very 
specific way according to strict rules of ritual performance. Even more 
importantly, these duties and obligations involve esoteric practices that 
must be performed out of sight and earshot of the uninitiated.15  
 
 12.  See generally PHILIPPE DESCOLA, BEYOND NATURE AND CULTURE (Janet Lloyd trans., 
2012); EDUARDO KOHN, HOW FORESTS THINK: TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY BEYOND THE 
HUMAN (2013); EDUARDO DE CASTRO, CANNIBAL METAPHYSICS: FOR A POST-STRUCTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY (Peter Skafish trans., 2014).  Others working with indigenous peoples of the 
Amazon, have argued that anthropology needs to go further than it currently does in 
understanding these people’s commitments to the beings of the non-human world and which 
they live—the plants, animals, rocks and rivers—so as to better appreciate the moral and 
ethical obligations that they claim to owe, and be owed, by these fellow beings.  As such, they 
have helped usher in what some have called the “ontological turn” in anthropology more 
generally.  See e.g., John Kelly, The Ontological Turn: Where Are We?, 4 J. ETHNOGRAPHIC 
THEORY 357 (2014). 
 13.  See DONGOSKE, supra note 3, at 603. 
 14.  Brief for Petitioner, Hopi Village of Shungopavi v. United States, No. 210 (Indian 
Claims Commission, Aug. 6, 1951). See also HARRY C. JAMES, PAGES FROM HOPI HISTORY 
102 (1974); PETER M. WHITELEY, HOPITUTSKWA: AN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE HOPI TRADITIONAL LAND CLAIM 1 (1989). 
 15.  SEVERIN FOWLES, AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF DOINGS: SECULARISM AND THE STUDY OF 
PUEBLO RELIGION 101 (2013); Justin B. Richland, Hopi Sovereignty as Epistemological Limit, 
24 WICAZO SA REV. 89 (2009); PAUL V. KROSKRITY, LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND IDENTITY: 
ETHNOLINGUISTIC STUDIES OF ARIZONA TEWA 15–6 (1993); Alfonso Ortiz, Ritual Drama and 
the Pueblo World View, in NEW AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUEBLOS 135 (Alfonso Ortiz 
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When viewed in this light, we have to ask, for whom are these 
lands wilderness? What effects, if any, does naming these lands 
“National Forests,” have on the capacity of Hopi people to exercise 
their religion? Moreover, how does such naming, and its effects, 
square with the presumptions of the First Amendment protections of 
religious freedom that Hopi, like all U.S. citizens, expect the right to 
enjoy, especially in public?  
To ask these questions, I want to next track a trail of another sort, 
this one of the legal filings and decisions that occupied the Hopi and 
other American Indian tribes as they wrangled with the U.S. National 
Forest and others over a different sacred place, the San Francisco 
Peaks, or what the Hopi call Nuvatukya’ovi.16 After this brief detour I 
will once again return to the dusty hills of the Tonto, and the 
engagements between Hopi and Forest Service archaeologists as they 
explored the significance of the footprints there. In so doing, this paper 
considers how U.S. federal laws, policies, and practices concerning the 
exercise of religious freedom are met by the efforts of Hopi people to 
practice their religious obligations on their aboriginal lands. Despite 
the longstanding recognition that Hopi religion demands an ethic, 
practice, and commitment toward stewardship of lands both on and off 
the contemporary Hopi Reservation, repeated attempts by Hopi to 
practice their religion on National Forest lands have been thwarted by 
U.S. officials. I then will conclude with some final reflections on what 
this all might say about the politics of religious freedom for the Hopi 
and other native nations in the United States today. 
I.  NUVATUKYA’OVI, IN THE COCONINO NATIONAL FOREST. 
Among the many footprints that both mark the thousands of years 
of history that the Hopi have occupied and traversed the lands we 
currently call central and northern Arizona, and which also continue to 
demand Hopi religious attention and stewardship, few are more 
significant or demand as much from the Hopi than Nuvatukya’ovi. 
Standing at 12,633 feet above sea level, what Euro-Americans call 
Mount Humphreys towers over the town of Flagstaff, with a 
population 67,468 in 2012.17  
 
ed., 1972). 
 16.  Maria Glowacka et al., Nuvatukya’ovi—San Francisco Peaks: Balancing Western 
Economies with Native American Spiritualities, 50 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 547 (Aug. 
2009). 
 17.  Id. at 555; Our Town—Flagstaff, http://canyonchapel.org/about/about-our-town-
flagstaff (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
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Nuvatukya’ovi is the highest mountain in Arizona. On most days 
it is easily visible from the mesa-top villages where the Hopi have lived 
since at least 1200 A.D..18 As a now-extinct volcano, the mountain’s 
steep slopes surge up from the relatively flat terrain beyond its foothills 
to its immediate north, casting a stark contrast, and a long rain shadow, 
across much of the Hopi and Navajo reservations. The result is that it 
also catches much of the moisture in this otherwise arid landscape, 
lending it robust pine forests and snowy peaks that attract outdoor 
enthusiasts from all over the region. Coupled with the Grand Canyon 
which sits less than a two hour drive to the north, Nuvatukya’ovi plays 
a big role in burnishing Flagstaff’s reputation as a mecca for outdoor 
enthusiasts of all stripes. Among those who flock to “Flag,” as the 
locals call it, invariably included are snowboarders and skiers who 
come to ride the slopes of Arizona Snowbowl, the only ski resort in the 
region, and one of the oldest in the West, operating on U.S. National 
Forest land since the 1930s.19 
For the Hopi, however, Nuvatukya’ovi is a mecca of a different 
sort. They consider it the home of the Katsinam, the ancestor spirits 
who visit them and their villages for half of every year and who bring 
with them the bounties and beneficence of rain.20 In exchange for this, 
the Hopi give thanks and prayers through an elaborate series of 
ceremonies that fill village nights and days from late December to mid-
July.21 Nuvatukya’ovi also marks the Hopi southwest cardinal 
direction, providing both literal and figurative axis of orientation for 
Hopivewat, the path of a good life. No wonder then that sacred shrines 
dot the landscape leading to and including many different places on 
Nuvatukya’ovi, and on which Hopi footprints, both past and present, 
are regularly visible. Hopi priests are required to make pilgrimages to 
Nuvatukya’ovi during key moments in their annual ceremonial 
calendar.22 Various materials, including spruce boughs, eagle feathers, 
and various other plant and animal resources required for their 
observances must be gathered on and around Nuvatukya’ovi.23 
As the Hopi tell it, and even without revealing any of the esoteric 
information that they are prohibited from telling a non-initiate like me 
(or anyone else, including other Hopis), there are few phenomena more 
 
 18.  Glowacka et al., supra note 16, at 552, 555. 
 19.  Id. at 547. 
 20.  Id. at 551. 
 21.  See id at 556. 
 22.  Id. at 553, 555–8. 
 23.  Id. at 553, 557–8; MISCHA TITIEV, OLD ORAIBI: A STUDY OF THE HOPI INDIANS OF 
THIRD MESA 246 (1944). 
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
2016] PATHS IN THE WILDERNESS 225 
central to Hopi life, religion, culture, and its practice than 
Nuvatkya’ovi. So it comes as little surprise that the Hopi tribe has been 
a regular opponent of repeat efforts by the Arizona Snowbowl 
Corporation to expand its ski resort capacity and have worked 
tirelessly to block the approval and permitting granted to such efforts 
by the U.S. Forest Service.24 The Hopi have fought on many different 
fronts, from public protests, to the lodging of civic complaints, to 
petitioning the federal government.25 They have done so whenever the 
Arizona Snowbowl has endeavored to broaden their impact on 
Nuvatukya’ovi, whether it be in requesting a permit to cut new ski 
trails, raising capital to renovate the ski lodge, or even adding new 
high-speed chair lifts to increase the number of skiers who can access 
the mountain at one time.26 All of these efforts have been met with 
Hopi protests, in one form or another. 
But for many Hopi, the most recent action by Arizona Snowbowl 
to expand its capacity is perhaps the most egregious affront to the 
culture and the religious obligations they owe to Nuvatukya’ovi. That 
is because the ski resort has introduced large scale artificial 
snowmaking operations on the mountain, an operation that is estimated 
to shower 1.5 million gallons daily of frozen reclaimed waste-water 
pumped from Flagstaff’s sewage treatment centers.27  
Now, as Arizona Snowbowl representatives tell it, and as the U.S. 
Forest Service Environmental Impact Assessment that approved it 
explains, the use of wastewater that has been reclaimed from Flagstaff 
home and industrial sewage is both safe and clean and offers the only 
sustainable way of making snow in a manner that offsets the 
environmental impact that comes from using so much water for 
 
 24.  See Justin B. Richland, Dignity as (Self-)Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the 
Face of US Dispossessions, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 917, 930–4 (2016); Glowacka, et al., 
supra note 16, at 547–50. 
 25.  See, e.g., Protests as Arizona Snowbowl Opens with 100% Treated Sewage Snow on 
Sacred Site, PROTECT THE PEAKS (Dec. 1, 2014, http://protectthepeaks.org/protests-as-arizona-
snowbowl-opens-with-100-treated-sewage-snow-on-sacred-site (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); 
Hopi Win Right to Continue Court Fight Against Snowbowl Wastewater on Sacred Peaks, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/01/08/hopi-win-right-continue-court-
fight-against-snowbowl-wastewater-sacred-peaks-153019. 
 26.  See Richland, supra note 24, at 930–4. 
 27.  FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ARIZ. SNOWBOWL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS 
FINAL EIS AND FOREST PLAN AMENDMENT #21, at 10 (2005); Robrt L. Pela, How Arizona 
Snowbowl Fakes Flakes for a Longer Ski Season, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/arts/how-arizona-snowbowl-fakes-flakes-for-a-longer-
ski-season-8018927. 
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recreational purposes.28 This is especially important when we recall 
that the San Francisco Peaks, and the Flagstaff region more generally, 
are a small oasis of moisture in an otherwise parched corner of the 
southwestern United States. The Hopi, themselves agriculturalists who 
practice a kind of dry-farming relying on specially adapted corn seeds, 
count on nothing more than the average 8.5 inches of rain annually to 
water their crops.29  
So while the idea that the Arizona Snowbowl is attempting to 
mitigate the water usage normally involved in making snow seems a 
good one, it only does so if you ignore so many other tragic ironies that 
spraying waste-water on Nuvatukya’ovi has for Hopi and other tribes 
in the region, ironies that the Hopi are quick to point out. To list only 
the most obvious one, consider that in blowing dirty water onto the 
home of the very ancestor spirits who bring water to Hopi dry-farmed 
crops is really more than an injury. It’s an insult. Indeed, in some sense, 
it is almost literally a large-scale act of pissing in the Hopi’s pot. 
In 2005, the Hopi Tribe, with the HCPO teams taking a lead role, 
joined with twelve other tribal nations in the region, as well as several 
well-known environmental advocacy groups (Sierra Club 
International, National Resource Defense Counsel, and others) in a 
lawsuit against the U.S. Forest Service.30 This was actually the second 
round of litigation that the Hopi and other tribes had entered into 
against the Forest Service and the Arizona Snowbowl, the first 
beginning in the early 1980s after a planned expansion of the resort.31  
In both the first and second rounds of litigation, the Hopi and 
other tribes had argued that the approvals that the U.S. Forest Service 
granted to the proposed actions of the ski resort constituted a violation 
of their rights, protected by the U.S. Constitution as enshrined in the 
language of the First Amendment, which holds that the government 
“shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”32 The Hopi and their co-
petitioners lost in the first round of litigation, when Judge Lumbard of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
decision of the U.S. District Court judge that the actions of the U.S. 
 
 28.  FOREST SERV., supra note 27, at 29–30. 
 29.  Duane L. Johnson & Mitra N. Jha, Blue Corn, in NEW CROPS 228–30 (Jules Janick & 
James E. Simon eds., 1993); MICHAEL A CRIMMINS ET AL., THE UNIV. OF ARIZ., HOPI CLIMATE: 
AN OVERVIEW TO SUPPORT DROUGHT MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT 2 (2015). 
 30.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 31.  Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (1983). 
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; Wilson, 708 F.2d 735; Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, 1063. 
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
2016] PATHS IN THE WILDERNESS 227 
Forest Service did not constitute a violation of petitioner’s free 
exercise of religion.33  
In coming to his decision Judge Lumbard followed a long line of 
case law to explain that the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment “proscribes government action that burdens religious 
beliefs or practices, unless the challenged action serves a compelling 
governmental interest that cannot be achieved in a less restrictive 
manner.”34  He explained that the First Amendment recognizes the 
absolute right to hold religious beliefs and that the free exercise clause 
prohibits both direct and indirect burdening of religion.35 The former 
generally concerns governmental actions “regulating, prohibiting, or 
rewarding religious beliefs as such.”36 The latter concerns 
governmental actions that through some sort of general benefit, 
prescription, or proscription “penalize adherence to religious 
beliefs.”37 In either case, the court explained, it is not enough that some 
governmental action merely offends religious believers or even casts 
doubt on their beliefs, for “unless such actions penalize faith, they do 
not burden religion.”38  
The court then applied these rules to the claims presented by the 
plaintiff tribes.39 Judge Lumbard found that the practices and beliefs 
described by the Hopi and other tribes were rooted in religion and that 
they had provided sufficient evidence “to establish the indispensability 
of the Peaks to the practice of [their] religion.”40 However, he went on 
to hold that the indispensability of the peaks alone does not establish 
that the U.S. Forest Service imposed an “impermissible burden” on the 
tribes’ religious beliefs and practices when it approved the 
development plan, primarily because the tribes were not prohibited 
from accessing the peaks to conduct their ceremonies, nor did they 
establish that they must access the actual sites on the land occupied 
and being developed under the proposed plan.41  
 
 33.  Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739–740. 
 34.  Id. at 740. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 741. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 743–44. 
 40.  Id. at 744. 
 41.  Id. (noting that “The Forest Service, however, has not denied the plaintiffs access to 
the Peaks, but instead permits them free entry onto the Peaks and does not interfere with their 
ceremonies or the collection of ceremonial objects. At the same time, the evidence does not 
show the indispensability of that small portion of the Peaks encompassed by the Snow Bowl 
permit area. The plaintiffs have not proven that expansion of the ski area will prevent them 
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Based on these and other findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
the court affirmed the summary judgment decision of the district court 
in favor of the defendants.42 Instead of understanding the larger cultural 
surroundings within which Hopi religious practices and beliefs regard 
Hopitutskwa generally, and their duties and obligations to 
Nuvatukya’ovi specifically, the court instead attempted to find a 
solution that cut and sliced up the mountain into areas and places in 
which some parts could be considered more important and 
indispensable than others to the practice of Hopi religion.43 Rather than 
seeing the total way in which “Nature” and “Culture” are indivisible in 
Hopi worldviews, Judge Lumbard and the others deciding this case 
imported a spatial and temporal understanding of Hopitutskwa that saw 
it in much the way certain secular worldviews would have it, as easily 
divisible between cultured and wild, sacred and secular.44 In this 
distinctively secularist orientation, the court smuggles in a view of the 
mountain that engages in as metaphysical and “cultured” a read on its 
character as “de-cultured” and “wild” as was the Hopi’s view of it as 
filled with ritual significance.45 When the court erases the cultural 
particular qualities of its sense of the mountain, treating its “wild” 
character instead as “natural” and “neutral” vis-à-vis the opposing 
parties and interests in this case, it gives itself the space to argue that 
it can then “split the difference” between Hopi and non-Hopi uses of 
Nuvatukya’ovi.46 Which is what it does when it finds that the U.S. 
Forest Service, in approving the use of only a portion of land of the 
peaks for the Snowbowl operation, engaged in a constitutionally 
admissible burden, one that the federal government can impose on the 
Hopi and other tribes without running afoul of their First Amendment 
rights to religious freedom.47  
The decision came as a serious, if not entirely surprising blow to 
the Hopi and their fellow tribal petitioners. As a result, they would 
eventually mount another legal challenge, based on a similar concern 
that their religious freedoms were being impermissibly impinged upon. 
When they returned to federal court in 2005, they actually thought that 
they had a stronger case.48 First, they believed that they could make the 
 
from performing ceremonies or collecting objects that can be performed or collected in the 
Snow Bowl but nowhere else.”) 
 42.  Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739. 
 43.  Id. at 735. 
 44.  See generally id. at 735. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, 1066. 
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strong factual argument that the proposed snowmaking using 
reclaimed wastewater would involve a kind of intrusion on their 
religious practices that would, with the coming of Spring, and the 
inevitable snowmelt, spread out beyond the boundaries of the ski resort 
to directly impact the whole of Nuvatukya’ovi and the Hopi shrines and 
material resources located on it.49 But secondly, they believed that they 
had new federal laws that would work in their favor. In the intervening 
years between the two rounds of litigation, the U.S. Congress passed 
the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).50 This 
legislation was enacted to reinstate the requirements that the Federal 
government must prove that it has a “compelling interest” when it 
imposes a “substantial burden” on a petitioner’s free exercise of 
religion and that this imposition is by the “least restrictive” manner 
possible.51  
Based on this change in the law, the Hopi and other tribes thus 
went back to court arguing that the Forest Service’s approval of 
Snowbowl’s snowmaking plan imposed a substantial burden on their 
free exercise of religion, and moreover that it did so for reasons that 
did not constitute a compelling government interest, nor did so in the 
“least restrictive manner,” thereby violating the new standards 
established by Congress through RFRA.52  
At first, the Hopi and their co-petitioners met with the same result 
in District Court, albeit this time in Arizona.53 Indeed, the District 
Court in the 2005 case even cited the 1983 opinion with approval, 
writing “the same decision is warranted here.”54 Moreover, the court 
held, even if there was a substantial burden on the free exercise of the 
Hopi and other tribes’ religions, the U.S. Forest Service’s decision 
would nonetheless be valid insofar as it was made pursuant to a 
compelling governmental interest “to provide the type of ‘out-door 
recreation’ mandated by” the federal legislation creating the Service 
and its Forest lands.55  
However, when the Hopi and other tribes appealed, they were met 
 
 49.  Megan Finnerty, Compromise Complicated in Debate Over Faith, Water, Land, 
REPUBLIC, (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/travel/2015/03/13/navajo-nation-
files-human-rights-protest-snowbowl-snow-making/70214892. 
 50.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S,C.C.A.N. {(107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1066. 
 53.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (D. Ariz. 2006). 
 54.  U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
 55.  Id. at 906. 
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
230 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:217 
with a surprisingly sympathetic panel of three Ninth Circuit judges.56 
In what was a remarkable victory, Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the 
panel, issued on March 12, 2007, found in the Hopi and other tribes’ 
favor and in the strongest of terms.57 Among other things, the panel 
found that through RFRA, Congress had intended to substantially 
expand the protections far beyond what the district court held in relying 
largely on case law interpretations of the free exercise clause from 
before RFRA’s enactment.58 As part of this reasoning, it explained that 
the amended RFRA defines the exercise of religion in ways that do not 
require that the protected beliefs be “compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.”59 It held that the District Court erred when 
it did not consider this amended definition of religious exercise and 
then required the tribes to prove that the snowmaking plan as approved 
by the U.S. Forest Service prevented them from “engaging in conduct 
or having a religious experience which the faith mandates.”60 Instead, 
the court explained, under RFRA, a burden on religious faith is 
“substantial” enough where, as with the snowmaking proposal, it 
would “undermine their entire system of belief and the associated 
practices of song, worship, and prayer that depend on the purity of the 
Peaks.”61 It then went on to find that the Forest Service’s actions did 
not meet the “compelling interest” test of RFRA, explaining that the 
district court shouldn’t have construed the government’s interest in 
broadly providing recreational opportunities, but rather more 
specifically in assisting the ski resort in increasing its snowmaking 
capacities, and with it, arguably, its economic bottom line.62 For these 
reasons, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
decision of the District Court as it applied to RFRA.63 
This was a victory for the tribes, and the Hopi and their co-
petitioners were right to celebrate it. It stood as the closest thing to a 
true “win” that the Hopi have experienced in their long battle to protect 
Nuvatukya’ovi. More importantly, it seemed to offer an interpretation 
of the religious freedom protections offered by Congress in RFRA in 
a manner that, at least to a certain extent, tracked their own 
understandings of their religious obligations. Recognizing that the 
importance of Nuvatukya’ovi and its purity to Hopi religion reaches 
 
 56.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d 1024 (2007). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 1033. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
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beyond any specific ritual conduct or experience on the mountain 
itself, Judge Fletcher and his fellow panelists seem to recognize, 
rightly, that the Hopi view their entire way of life as an unfolding path 
deeply imbricated in the woof and weave that bind them to their lands 
through their multitude of cultural practices, past, present, and future 
that constitute the on-going fulfillment of their agreement to Maasaw.64  
Alas, the victory, however real, was short lived. In response to the 
panel’s judgment, Arizona Snowbowl and the U.S. Forest Service 
petitioned for a rehearing by the full panel of judges of the Ninth 
Circuit. On October 17, 2007, their petition was granted. The Order of 
Chief Judge Mary Schroeder explained, “Upon a majority vote of the 
nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that the case 
be reheard by the en banc court . . . The three judge panel opinion shall 
not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any District Court of the 
Ninth Circuit.”65  
In December 2007, eleven judges reheard the matter and, in a 10-
1 judgment, the court reversed Judge Fletcher and his fellow judges’ 
prior analysis and affirmed the judgment of the District Court.66 In this 
reversal and affirmation, the opinion of Judge Carlos T. Bea held that 
even though RFRA had expanded the kinds of religious practices that 
cannot be substantially burdened by government actions, it did not 
change the kinds of burdens that would be considered substantial.67 As 
a result, the court held, while the proposed snowmaking violated the 
Hopi and other petitioners’ sincerely held religious beliefs, “the 
diminishment of spiritual fulfillment – serious though it may be – is 
not a ‘substantial burden’ on the free exercise of religion” as defined 
either in Supreme Court precedents interpreting the First Amendment 
or in the language of RFRA itself.68 Once again the Hopi found 
themselves on the losing side of their courtroom battle to exercise their 
religious freedoms in and to Nuvatukya’ovi. 
Interestingly, while the U.S. Forest Service has sided with the 
Arizona Snowbowl throughout these proceedings, it is notable that in 
other contexts the Forest Service has identified Nuvatukya’ovi and all 
of the San Francisco Peaks as a “traditional cultural property.”69 
 
 64.  PETER M. WHITELEY, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY (1998). 
 65.  Navajo Nation et. al. v. United States Forest Service, No. 06-15455  D.C. No. CV-
05-01824-PGR Order of October 17, 2007.  
 66.  Navajo Nation et. al. v. United States Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 67.  Id. at 1070. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 D. Ariz. (2006). 
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
232 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:217 
“Traditional cultural property” has been defined in the National 
Register Bulletin 38: Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting 
Traditional Cultural Properties as being associated with “cultural 
practices or beliefs of a living community that a) are rooted in that 
community’s history and b) are important in maintaining the 
continuing cultural identity of the community.”70 The U.S. Forest 
Service has not only acknowledged that the San Francisco Peaks are 
sacred to the 13 tribes71 but also determined that the peaks are eligible 
for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places.72  
What to make of this seemingly contradictory commitment of the 
U.S. Forest Service is an ongoing question not just for the 
academically interested but from a policy perspective with questions 
regarding of the meaning of the free exercise of religion for Native 
Americans like the Hopi.73 Equally, and arguably more fundamentally, 
it is a question for the members of the Hopi tribe themselves, those 
who must take up these matters every time they wonder about their 
many and varied obligations to the lands with which their everyday 
lives are deeply intertwined.  
II.  ITAAKUKU IN TONTO NATIONAL FOREST. 
Such considerations were almost certainly on the minds of 
members of the HCPO that I was with on that hot dusty hill who were 
being asked to consult with the U.S. Forest Service archaeologist at 
Tonto about the traditional cultural properties that were in its control 
and the proposed sale of some of the lands surrounding the Payson 
Ranger Station, on which certain traditional cultural properties were 
located. 
Just like in the Arizona Snowbowl case, this engagement with the 
U.S. Forest Service was happening as the result of the agency’s plan 
to take action it knew would impact those resources. In this case, the 
action to be taken was the sale of a part of the Forest in which we were 
now hiking to a group of local investors who had plans to develop it.  
Pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act, Council on 
 
 70.  PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS F. KING, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND 
DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 28 (1998).   
 71.  Brenda Norrell, Lawsuit Filed to Halt Peaks Desecration, INDIAN COUNTY TODAY, 
July 11, 2005. 
 72.  Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 905 D. Ariz. 
(2006). 
 73.  See PATRICIA L. PARKER AND THOMAS F. KING, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND 
DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 28 (1998). 
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Environmental Quality Regulations,74 federal agencies are required to 
conduct an environmental assessment of the impact that any proposed 
action is likely to have on both natural and cultural resources that occur 
on lands under their control.75  The Hopi were there because the HCPO 
responded to a request for consultation from the U.S. Forest Service 
that was sent to a number of regional tribes. To hear the Forest Service 
Archaeologist tell it, Hopi is one of the few tribes to have a coordinated 
cultural resources office, and thus one of the few to respond when such 
invitations are put out there.76  
But given the history of its engagements, the HCPO’s decision to 
participate was anything but unequivocal. As HCPO Director Leigh 
Kuwanwisiwma told me two days earlier, he really wondered what 
interests such consultations actually served. “Are we just helping them 
to do what they were gonna do anyway?”77 he asked, acknowledging 
how Hopi involvement was treated as a step in an environmental 
assessment process that, though required by federal law, always 
seemed to come at a time when the federal action already seemed to be 
at or near completion.  The Director’s comments suggest the 
possibility that the decisions by other tribes not to respond to U.S. 
Forest Service requests for consultation were motivated by something 
other than the lack of organizational competence that the 
archaeologists claim it was. Perhaps it was a form of much more 
present absence, a refusal, or a deferral, that holds open certain 
possibilities (maybe freedoms) for later engagement in a way that 
cannot so easily be appropriated to the ends of the state. Such a 
possibility is entirely consistent with other instances of tribal 
engagement with federal authorities, such as what occurred with the 
controversial approval of the Hopi tribal constitution in 1936, which 
the federal government rightly claimed was approved by a majority of 
Hopi who voted, but which only can count as a true endorsement of 
the constitution if you choose to ignore (as the federal government 
chooses to do) the fact that only a third of the eligible Hopi voters—
755 of 2,538—even showed up to cast a ballot.78 Against this long 
history of nonperformance as a sign of dissent and/or disagreement, 
the decision by other tribes not to respond to the request for 
consultation can be understood as a kind of silent protest, and one that, 
 
 74.  40 CFR 1508.9 (2016). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  (Personal Communication, Interview of 7-10-13).  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Justin B. Richland, Hopi Tradition as Jurisdiction: On the Potentializing Limits of 
Hopi Sovereignty, 36 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 201–34 (2016). 
RICHLANDFINALBOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2017  4:22 PM 
234 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:217 
from the Director’s words, may soon be the response of the Hopi tribe 
to such invitations as well. 
Indeed, in many ways the Director’s express fears would be 
confirmed when the Hopi arrived at the Tonto Ranger Station in 
Payson on the first day of the consult. At that briefing, which occurred 
the day before our hike, the Hopi were told by the Archaeologist that 
the U.S. Forest Service was already committed to selling the land in 
question, in part because it was surrounded on all sides by the growing 
town of Payson, making it impossible to efficiently manage.79 As a 
result, he explained, any recommendations made by the Hopi Tribal 
representatives regarding how to manage the eleven archaeological 
sites they were going to visit on the consultation could not include a 
recommendation of “avoidance”—a category of practice described in 
federal guidelines as one possible recommendation for cultural 
resource management and which requires the service to leave the 
traditional property in situ. Avoidance, I would later be told by HCPO 
staff, is the preferred recommendation that HCPO representatives 
make when consulting with agencies, including the U.S. Forest Service 
on such matters. It did seem that the Archaeologist almost expected 
that to be the recommendation the Hopi were going to make. As a 
result, the perfunctory and unprompted manner in which the Forest 
Service Archaeologist raised the option of avoidance, only to take it 
off the table, led two of the Hopi representatives to pointedly ask him 
why, if this is not an option, they were even being invited to consult. 
“If this has already been decided, what is there left for us to do,” one 
man asked. “For us, the whole point is to leave these things in the 
ground.” He then explained, “We call them ‘itaakuku, footprints,’ 
because they show where our people have been. And when we 
encounter them we leave offerings to the people that are still there, we 
apologize for disturbing them, and we thank them for what they have 
given us.” 
It is, I would argue, important to understand the Hopi preference 
for avoidance of such sites by understanding what exactly these places 
mean to them. Significantly, a literal translation of “itaakuku” (“our 
footfalls”) suggests the close connection that contemporary Hopi lives 
have with such sites, pointing to the deeply held religious covenant that 
 
 79.  HCPO–USFS Traditional Cultural Property Consultation Meeting, Payson Ranger 
District, USFS Tonto National Forest, July 10-11, 2013 (Audio recording and transcriptions 
on file with author), see also Saul Hedquist and Stuart Koyiyumptewa, Hopi Tradtional 
Cultural Preservation Investigation for the Proposed Payson Ranger District Administration 
Site Sale, Submitted to Tonto National Forest, US Dept. of Agriculture, Phoenix Arizona. 
August 2, 2013, pg. 2. 
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Hopi made with Maasaw and which they still see themselves as 
engaged in fulfilling. For Maasaw instructs them, “ang kutota” (“Go 
along, making footfalls”),80 and it is an obligation they continue to 
fulfill to this day. The obligation was/is not just to travel to the places 
where the Hopi had been, but also, along the way, to acquire the secret 
knowledge that informs their ceremonial obligations, obligations 
whose continuous correct performance are critical to the wellbeing of 
their community, both in the past and today. Indeed, as others have 
described, an important element of these ceremonies is precisely the 
enactment again (not reenactment, but rather the constitutive doing-
still) of these migrations, both ritualistically on the Hopi reservation 
and also by going out to the relevant places that are marked by 
itaakuku, as the places that Hopi were/are. Such places are active and 
alive for them: they demand special treatment and that they be 
maintained as undisturbed markers of Hopi presence. 
But avoidance was not an option, they were told. Instead, the 
Forest Service Archaeologist then explained, the consultation was to 
assist the Archaeologists in determining what (if any) kind of 
mitigation could be possible to the anticipated impacts that the sale of 
the land would have on the cultural properties. “Mitigation” also has 
its specific meaning within federal regulations and refers to the kinds 
of actions that U.S. Forest Service personnel, including these 
Archaeologists, can take with regard to impacted cultural properties, 
but only once the properties have been deemed “eligible” for inclusion 
in the National Register of Historic Places.”81 In short, what the Forest 
Service archaeologist was requesting was a consultation that would 
provide evidence sufficient to justify expenditure of federal funds for 
excavating the sites.  
It turns out that the eligibility criteria for including traditional 
cultural properties in the National Registry, though they are described 
as turning on their “significance” in the “cultural practices or beliefs 
of a living community”82 in fact turn more on what they can reveal 
about a community’s past, than what they mean for a community’s 
religious present/presence. 
 
 80.  Leigh J. Kuwanwisiwma & T. J. Ferguson, Hopitutskwa and Ang Kuktota; The Role 
of Archaeological Sites in Defining Hopi Cultural Landscapes, in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF 
MEANINGFUL PLACES 90–106 (Brenda J. Bowser & Marìa Nieves Zedeño, eds., 2009). 
 81.  Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 USCA 470), and 
36CFR800, which implement section 106. PATRICIA L. PARKER AND THOMAS F. KING, 
GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1 
(1998).   
 82.  Id. 
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The National Registry’s eligibility criteria are outlined in 36 CFR 
60.4. They read, in relevant part: 
The quality of significance . . . is present in districts, 
sites, buildings, structures, and objects . . .  
that are associated with events that have made a 
significant contribution to the broad patterns of our 
history; or 
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons 
significant in our past; or 
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, 
period, or method of construction, or that represent the 
work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or 
that represent a significant and distinguishable entity 
whose components may lack individual distinction; or 
(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, 
information important in prehistory or history.83 
Though implicit in these criteria is the notion that an eligible site 
or object is worth preserving because what it tells us about the past is 
important to communities of the present (and future), the explicit 
orientation to what such sites tell us largely about historical persons or 
events makes problematic an evaluation of their importance by virtue 
of their current meaningfulness, whether as a site of religious 
observance or otherwise. This double bind echoes of what Elizabeth 
Povinelli calls the “cunning” of the politics of multiculturalism and 
recognition, insofar as they require indigenous peoples to prove their 
indigeneity in a way that meets non-indigenous expectations of what it 
means to be “native,” and doing so in a way which most indigenous 
peoples have a difficult time meeting.84 Similarly, for an archaeological 
site to be sufficiently “significant” to be eligible as a traditional cultural 
property for the National Register, it must have importance as a site of 
historico-cultural significance, but only in a way that is legible to the 
scientists who evaluate such things.85 By making their contemporary 
meaningfulness as scientific evidence of the past the presumptive 
 
 83.  36 CFR 60.4 (2016). 
 84.  ELIZABETH POVINELLI, THE CUNNING OF RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS ALTERITIES AND 
THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM 180 (2002). 
 85.  36 CFR 60.4 (2016), but see Parker and King 1998, discussing the need to consider 
traditional cultural properties in terms of their ongoing relevance to living indigenous 
communities. Despite this, the USFS archaeologists here, and the justices in the Arizona Snow 
Bowl litigation, failed to appreciate this significance in a way that took note of the totalizing 
nature of Hopi cultural and religious commitments to their sacred spaces. See also 
Kuwanwisiwma & Ferguson, supra note X, at X; Brenda J. Bowser and Maria Nieves Zedeño 
ed., in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEANINGFUL PLACES 90–106. 
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ground of any petition for entry in the National Register (that is, why 
else would someone want to protect a site, except that he or she finds 
it meaningful), the possibility for discerning precisely how such a site 
holds meaning is something that is presumed to be understood in the 
unstated mode of the modern secularist worldview. This is a 
significance that can be explained as historical memorialization, or 
even sociocultural veneration, but not contemporary, and on-going, 
indigenous religious belief or practice.  
Back on that dusty trail, when we finally crested the hill on which 
sat what the Forest Service Archaeologist called AR-03-12-04-2046,86 
the expressions of reverence, exclamation, and thanks offered by the 
Hopi representatives seemed to fall on ears even more deaf than mine. 
When the archaeologist finally asked them, “What do you think, is this 
place significant?” the answer that was provided sounded at once 
incredulous and resigned. “Well, yeah,” one Hopi man said. “This 
place would be an important outlook to see anyone coming.” After a 
long pause, but before the archaeologist could respond, the man 
quickly added, “There’s– there’s ceremonies at Hopi that still recount 
the path ah– to Hopi. And this is still very much alive. And these places 
that they have left you know, people are still– we believe that…spirits 
are still there. So [if] we disturb that, or somehow allow that to be 
disturbed is a form of taboo, I guess.”87  
After taking some time to try to explain this more, but seeming to 
fail, a few of the Hopi representatives fell silent again as they began 
pulling leather pouches from their backpacks. The pouches each had 
different markings I recognized as various clan symbols. I had seen 
similar ones before at village ceremonies and thus suspected they 
carried homa, sacred corn meal that had been ritually blessed. But 
before opening them, a Hopi man asked the non-Hopis present, 
including me, if we wouldn’t mind moving on to the next site. They 
would then catch up to us, he explained, but only after doing “some 
things,” which I imagine meant leaving offerings. But I never got to 
confirm this because I obliged their request and didn’t ask them about 
it afterward. 
 
 86.  Saul Hedquist and Stuart Koyiyumptewa, Hopi Tradtional Cultural Preservation 
Investigation for the Proposed Payson Ranger District Administration Site Sale, Submitted to 
Tonto National Forest, US Dept. of Agriculture, Phoenix Arizona. August 2, 2013, pg. 2. 
 87.  Audio recorded exchange, July 10, 2013. Recording and Transcript on Record with 
author. See also Saul Hedquist and Stuart Koyiyumptewa, Hopi Tradtional Cultural 
Preservation Investigation for the Proposed Payson Ranger District Administration Site Sale, 
Submitted to Tonto National Forest, US Dept. of Agriculture, Phoenix Arizona 2 (August 2, 
2013). 
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The pattern would continue throughout the day, until all the sites 
had been visited and commented upon. We then left Payson and the 
Tonto Forest Archaeologist with the promise that the HCPO would be 
providing a report of their traditional cultural property investigation 
and its recommendations for how the U.S. Forest Service should 
proceed with regard to the sites they saw.  
As promised, on August 2, 2013, the HCPO submitted its report 
to the U.S. Forest Service, a thirty page document commenting on all 
the sites and making recommendations for avoidance, where possible, 
and archaeological mitigation where necessary.88 One week earlier, on 
July 26, 2013, the U.S. Forest Service entered into a Memorandum of 
Agreement with the State Historic Preservation Office to undertake the 
mitigation efforts the Service recommended in dealing with the 
traditional cultural properties, efforts that included “data recovery 
excavation…developed in consultation with . . . Tribes . . . [including] 
an ethnohistoric study…undertaken by the Hopi Tribe.”89 On August 
9, 2013, the Forest Service Supervisor issued its finding of No 
Significant Impact and Decision Notice, approving the sale of the land. 
Despite the HCPO team’s willingness to travel the many miles from 
their reservation to consult with the U.S. Forest Service on the 
proposed sale, and their express concerns, offered orally and in 
writing, that the sale of the lands in question would substantially 
impact on going ceremonial and other religious obligations, the Forest 
Service went ahead with the sale anyway. Just as they experienced with 
the Arizona Snow Bowl case, the good faith efforts that Hopi made to 
consult with their counterparts regarding the value and import of their 
itaakuku were treated more as a procedural hurdle rather than anything 
else. As such, a genuine opportunity  was missed—and the chance to 
reach a compromise to the relevant satisfaction of all the communities 
and cultures, Hopi and non-Hopi, native and otherwise—whose 
“footprints” dot this landscape.  
Despite these setbacks the Hopi have continued to press their 
claims to protect their itaakuku on a variety of different fronts. They 
have even continued their fight against the expansion of the Arizona 
Snowbowl and the planned use of reclaimed wastewater. After losing 
in the Ninth Circuit, the Hopi joined with tribal petitioners and, in 
January of 2009, petitioned for a writ of certiorari to have the case 
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, 
 
 88.  Hedquist & Koyiyumptewa, supra note 80. 
 89.  (US Forest Service, Tonto National Forest, Findings of No Significant Impact, 
Decision Notice, Payson Ranger District Site Sale, 2013, pg.3). 
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denied certiorari on June 8, 2009. The Hopi tribe shifted tactics and 
filed an action in the state courts of Arizona against the city of 
Flagstaff, claiming that their 2002 agreement to sell reclaimed 
wastewater to Arizona Snowbowl created a public nuisance that 
violated state law. Those efforts initially stumbled as well, when the 
trial judge dismissed their case. But on appeal the dismissal was 
overturned by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona Supreme 
Court upheld the appellate decision in 2014, allowing the Hopi’s case 
to proceed. 
III. OPTIONS?  
On a recent trip back to the Hopi Reservation, where I am again 
working closely with the HCPO, I found myself speaking with one of 
the HCPO staff, a non-Hopi who, after a decade of work with the U.S. 
Forest Service, left the job to go work with the Hopi Tribe as a legal 
researcher. This was thirty years ago. As we talked, he wondered aloud 
about what effects, if any, the current makeup of the U.S. Supreme 
Court might have for Hopi and other Native American’s rights to the 
free exercise of their religions. In particular, he was at once intrigued, 
but ultimately pessimistic by what he saw in the Court’s recent 
decision in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,90 and its 
interpretation of RFRA. In that case, decided on June 30, 2014, the 
Court in a 5-4 split decision held that the Affordable Care Act imposed 
a “substantial burden” on the Holly Lobby Corporation’s religious 
liberty when it required employers to provide health insurance to 
employees that included a provision for included no-cost access to 
birth control.91 The Court went on to conclude that insofar as that 
“substantial burden” was not pursuant to a “compelling government 
interest” undertaken in the “least restrictive way” possible, it 
constituted a violation of RFRA and was thus illegal.92  
What seemed most striking to my colleague was the possibility 
that this Court, whose conservatives were otherwise proving 
themselves overtly antagonistic to other types of Tribal Nation rights,93 
 
 90.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Company, 554 
U.S. 316 (2008); see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (providing a general 
discussion); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism 
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1214 (2001) (explaining that, even before 
the appointments of Justices Roberts and Alito shifted the Court’s politics decidedly rightward, 
had already been issuing opinions hostile to established principles of tribal sovereignty and 
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were maybe finding themselves in Hobby Lobby on a side in which 
they stood with, not against, tribal nations. The only explanation for 
the reversal that my friend could come up with was that tribes could 
maybe simply draft along behind the clear passes this Court wants to 
give to corporations. As he said, after his best gallows-tinged guffaw, 
it perhaps made sense, once the Justices found “that there are all sorts 
of personhood in corporations, they don’t need to find it in Indians 
anymore.”  
The sharper edge of this irony is only felt when we recall that the 
rather dim view taken by the Ninth Circuit of the Hopi’s RFRA rights, 
and the more general view of the Supreme Court toward the rights and 
privileges of tribal nations more generally, is all taking place against a 
period of federal policy that is still sometimes referred to as the era of 
“Indian Self-Determination.”94 It is named after the Indian Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA),95 
whose passage is understood to have ushered it in, and with it, what 
many consider to be the most successful period of Indian governance, 
economic growth, and general wellbeing since the onset of U.S. 
colonial oversight.96  
That Act, especially after further amendments made in 1994 
under the title of the Indian Self-Governance Act of 1994,97 allows 
tribal nations that have applied for and opted into what is called the 
“Indian Self-Governance Program” to contract and compact with the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, other agencies within the Department of 
Interior, and with Indian Health Services, to take over the planning, 
implementation, and on-going management of tribal government 
operations that had heretofore been largely directed by the federal 
government back in Washington, DC.98  
Of course, with reference to the interactions described in this 
paper, and the general frustrations felt by the Hopi at the hands of 
 
self-governance). 
 94.  CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 192 
(2006); See also ERIC C. HENSON, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER 
U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2008). 
 95.  25 USC §450 et seq. 
 96.  HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF 
THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2008)  
 97.  25 USC §§458aa–hh. 
 98.   25 USC § 458cc, which provides, that funding agreements entered into between 
tribes and the Secretary of the Interior shall “authorize the tribe to plan, conduct, consolidate, 
and administer programs, services functions and activities, or portions thereof administered 
by the Secretary of the Interior that are otherwise available to Indian tribes or Indians for which 
appropriations are made to agencies other than the Department of the Interior 
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decisions made by the U.S. Forest Service, it is important to note that 
the ISDEAA doesn’t apply to that agency, given that it is not a part of 
the Department of the Interior or Indian Health, but rather housed in 
the Department of Agriculture. So no effort to pursue a similar kind of 
contract or compact for managing the care and use of Hopi itaakuku or 
other cultural resources would have been possible, at least as it applies 
to Nuvatukya’ovi or the places we visited together in the Tonto. 
Yet this may be the only viable option for tribal nations, given the 
current hostility of the federal judiciary. This at least was the 
impression I got from Richard A. Guest, when I heard him speak on 
March 6, 2008, to those of us who had gathered for a conference on 
tribal courts at American University’s Washington College of Law. 
Guest is the managing attorney of the Washington, D.C., Office of the 
Native American Right’s Fund and lead attorney of its Tribal Supreme 
Court Project, a project “which is based on the principle that a 
coordinated and structured approach to tribal advocacy before the U.S. 
Supreme Court is necessary to preserve tribal sovereignty.”99 His 
words of advice for the tribal officials who might want to press their 
legal claims in federal court were simple, if no less remarkable: “Don’t 
do it.” He went on to say that this was advice based not only on wanting 
tribes to appreciate how their specific economic, political, and 
territorial interests were likely to be met with skepticism, but also the 
fact that the string of negative decisions from the Supreme Court had, 
even by 2008, gotten so long that it seemed that any filing of federal 
litigation seemed to be an invitation to the Court to roll back any and 
all precedents that protected even a  modicum of tribal self-
governance. He finished by saying, “Right now, filing in federal court 
sets us all up to lose.”100 
Given this, it seems that a tribal-friendly reading of RFRA, even 
after Hobby Lobby, is not likely to come any time soon. The sour 
sentiments of my colleagues at the HCPO thus would seem well-
founded, or at least supported by other corners of the Federal Indian 
Law community, where the sense of federal judiciary’s recognition of 
tribal sovereignty seems equally grim.  
 
 99.  Richard A. Guest, Native American Rights Fund (2016), 
http://www.narf.org/profiles/richard-guest.   
 100.  See Comments of Richard Guest, Native American Rights Fund, to the 2008 
Founder’s Celebration, American University Washington College of Law, What Do We Know 
About Tribal Courts? (March 6, 2008). Notes on File with Author. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
Despite these challenges, the Hopi tribe has not given up their 
efforts to protect their itaakuku on a variety of different fronts. Indeed, 
they have even continued their now decades long fight against the 
expansion of the Arizona Snowbowl. After losing in the Ninth Circuit 
and having their petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme 
Court a year later, the Hopi tribe shifted tactics and filed an action in 
the state courts of Arizona against the city of Flagstaff. There they 
claimed that the city’s agreement in 2002 to sell reclaimed wastewater 
to Arizona Snowbowl, an agreement that wasn’t activated until 2012 
given the on-going litigation, created a public nuisance that violated 
Arizona state law.101 Here they seemed to gain some traction. Though 
the trial judge dismissed their claim in 2011, his opinion was reversed 
by the Arizona Court of Appeals in 2013.102  The Arizona Supreme 
Court then declined to hear the City’s appeal in 2014, allowing the case 
to go forward.103 Since then, proceedings have been ongoing, and in 
July 2015 reports emerged of efforts by the two sides to enter into 
settlement negotiations.104 Then on March 11, 2016, a press release 
from the Hopi Tribe announced that it had approved the terms of a 
settlement with the city of Flagstaff and urged the Flagstaff City 
Council to do the same after it had tabled the matter on March 9.105 
Though it remains to be seen whether the City of Flagstaff and 
the Hopi Tribe can come to a workable settlement, it is interesting to 
note what at least some of the terms of the proposed settlement 
agreement provide. Most importantly, I would argue, at least for this 
paper and what might just be a workable solution for various efforts by 
the Hopi and other tribes to protect their religious freedoms, are those 
 
 101.  Hopi Tribe v. City of Flagstaff, Coconino County Superior Court No. 
S0300CV201100201 (August 19, 2011) 
 102.  Hopi Tribe v. City of Flagstaff, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0370 (April 25, 2013) (Ariz. Ct of 
Appeals, Div. 1, Dept C.) (Unpublished Opinion) pursuant to Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); 
ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24) 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20AZCO%2020130425009/HOPI%20TRIBE%20v.%2
0CITY%20OF%20FLAGSTAFF# (Accessed March 15, 2016) 
 103.  Arizona High Court Lets Hopi Snowbowl Suit Continue, AZ CENTRAL (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/free/20140108pni-wir-arizona-hopi-snowbowl-
lawsuit-reclaimed-water-flagstaff.html 
 104.  Katherine Locke, Hopi Tribe and City of Flagstaff Try to Resolve Snowmaking 
Lawsuit, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (July 21, 2015), 
http://nhonews.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=17018. 
 105.  Suzanne Adams-Ockrassa, Settlement Tabled: Flagstaff Council Tables Hopi 
Snowmaking Settlement, AZ DAILY SUN (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://azdailysun.com/business/local/flagstaff-council-tables-hopi-snowmaking-
settlement/article_1aa5bfcd-8311-5a23-8289-7a2dc6a85a97.html. 
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provisions that call for something like co-management of the 
wastewater treatment policies. Section 2 of the proposed “Settlement 
Agreement and Release,” requires that the City of Flagstaff  “will 
provide the Hopi Tribe . . . quarterly reports . . . on water quality testing 
at the reclaimed treatment facility that delivers reclaimed water to 
Snowbowl,” as well as “annual reports that demonstrate that the City 
has reasonably exercised its discretion in maintaining additional 
treatment processes.”106 Finally, failure to provide such reports 30 days 
after being notified by the Hopi tribe of their failure to be received shall 
constitute a breach of the Agreement.107  
Though the agreement is clear that it “creates no additional 
standing or entitlement to remedies for the Hopi Tribe before . . . any 
other governmental or administrative body to force the City to cure a 
reclaimed water quality issue.”108 I would suggest that this nonetheless 
counts as a least a small victory in their ongoing fight for their religious 
freedoms and the itaakuku that they are obligated through their religion 
to protect. For while this agreement does not rise to the level of self-
government of the sort that is enshrined and encouraged by the Indian 
Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, and other 
beneficial legislation, it goes a lot further in the direction of co-
management and shared concern than anything that has been offered 
to the Hopi and other tribes through recent decisions of the federal 
judiciary.  
Perhaps most importantly, the terms of co-management of the sort 
suggested by the terms of this settlement agreement actually have their 
echoes in Hopi traditions of governance, ones that they will tell you, 
turn less on coercion and more on cooperation, though without 
necessarily giving up one’s autonomy. As Emory Sekquaptewa, Chief 
Justice of the Hopi Appellate Court, once put it, “Hopi culture is 
cooperation without surrender.”109 Perhaps then, in this way, the terms 
of co-management expressed in their settlement agreement with the 
City of Flagstaff, may actually provide a way for the Hopi to promote 
their cultural commitments, even in the face of the challenges posed 
by the federal agencies and courts described here.  
 
 
 106.  SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE, Section 2, Reporting. (On File with Author) 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  DAVID L. SHAUL HOPI TRADITIONAL LITERATURE 189 (2002) (quoting Emory 
Sekquaptewa). 
